We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other agent up to the removal of one good. In addition, an allocation is deemed efficient if it satisfies Pareto efficiency. While each of these well-studied properties is easy to achieve separately, achieving them together is far from obvious. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [11] established the surprising result that when agents have additive valuations for the goods, there always exists an allocation that simultaneously satisfies these two seemingly incompatible properties. Specifically, they showed that an allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare objective is both EF1 and Pareto efficient. However, the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare is NP-hard. As a result, this approach does not provide an efficient algorithm for finding a fair and efficient allocation.
INTRODUCTION
The theory of fair division addresses the fundamental problem of allocating goods or resources among agents in a fair and efficient manner. Such problems arise in many real-world settings such as government auctions, divorce settlements, and border disputes. Starting with the work of Steinhaus [30] , there is now a vast literature in economics and mathematics to formally address fair division [7, 8, 26] . Many interesting connections have also been found between fair division and fields such as topology, measure theory, combinatorics, and algorithms [25] . approximation guarantees have also been developed for more general market models such as piecewise-linear concave utilities [1] , budget additive valuations [18] , and multi-unit markets [4] .
While the problem of approximating NSW is interesting in its own right, it is relevant to note that an allocation that approximates this objective is, in and of itself, not guaranteed to be EF1 or Pareto efficient (refer to the full version [3] for an example). 4 A second key contribution of our work is to show that our algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation to the NSW maximization problem. Thus, not only does our algorithm improve upon the best-known approximation ratio for this problem (namely, the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al. [12] ), it is also guaranteed to return a fair and efficient outcome. The following list summarizes our contributions.
Our contributions
• We develop an algorithm for computing an EF1 and Pareto efficient allocation for additive valuations. The running time of our algorithm is pseudopolynomial for general integral valuations (Theorem 3.1) and polynomial when the valuations are bounded (Remark 1).
In addition, our algorithm can find an approximate EF1 and approximate Pareto efficient allocation in polynomial time even without the bounded valuations assumption (Remark 2).
• We establish a stronger existence result compared to Caragiannis et al. [11] : For additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient (Theorem 3.2). In other words, the problem of finding an EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient allocation is total. An interesting complexity-theoretic implication of this result is that there exists a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm for finding an EF1 and Pareto efficient allocation (Remark 3). This implication does not directly follow from the existence result of Caragiannis et al. [11] , as the problem of verifying whether an arbitrary allocation is Pareto efficient is known to be co-NP-complete [14] .
• We show that our algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation for the Nash social welfare (NSW) maximization problem (Theorem 3.3). This improves upon the best known approximation factor for this problem (namely, the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al. [12] ), and also matches the lower bound of e 1/e ≈ 1.44 on the integrality gap of the convex program of Cole et al. [12] . An interesting byproduct of our analysis is a novel connection between envy-freeness and NSW: Under identical valuations, an EF1 allocation provides a 1.45-approximation to the maximum NSW (Lemma 3.4).
Our techniques It is known from the fundamental theorems of welfare economics that markets tend toward efficiency. Intuitively, our results are based on establishing a complementary result that markets can be fair as well. In particular, we construct a Fisher market along with an underlying equilibrium which is integral (i.e., corresponding to an allocation of the indivisible goods) and EF1. The fact that this allocation is a market equilibrium ensures, via the first welfare theorem, that it is Pareto efficient as well.
More concretely, we start with a Pareto efficient allocation, and iteratively modify the allocation by exchanging goods between the agents. The goal of the exchange step is to locally move toward a fair allocation. Additionally, throughout these exchanges, we maintain a set of prices that ensure that the current allocation corresponds to an equilibrium outcome for the existing market. We stop when the equilibrium of the market (i.e., the allocation at hand) satisfies price envy-freeness up to one good (refer to Section 4.1 for a formal definition). Essentially, this property ensures that under the given market prices, the spending of an agent is at least that of any other agent up to the removal of the highest priced good from the other agent's bundle. Requiring the spendings to 4 We also provide an example in the full version [3] in which every rounding of the "spending restricted outcome"-a market equilibrium notion used in the design of approximation algorithms for NSW [1, 12, 13] be balanced in this manner implies the desired EF1 property for the corresponding fair division instance; see Section 4 for a detailed description of this construction. At a conceptual level, our approach differs from the existing approaches in two important ways: First, our algorithm works with an integral Fisher market at every step, thereby breaking away from the standard relax-and-round paradigm where a fractional market equilibrium is first computed (typically as a solution of some convex program) followed by a rounding step [1, 2, 12, 13, 18] . Second, unlike all existing approaches, our algorithm uses the notion of price envy-freeness up to one good as a measure of balanced spending in the Fisher market. To the best of our knowledge, this notion is novel to this work, and might find future use in the design of fair and efficient algorithms for other settings.
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 The Fair Division Model
Problem instance An instance of the fair division problem is a tuple ⟨[n], [m] , V⟩, where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of n ∈ N agents, [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m} denotes the set of m ∈ N goods, and the valuation profile V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } specifies the preferences of each agent i ∈ [n] over the set of goods [m] via a valuation function v i : 2 [m] → Z + ∪ {0}. We will assume throughout that the valuation functions are additive, i.e., for each agent i ∈ [n] and any set of goods
. 5 For simplicity, we will write v i, j instead of v i ({j}) for a singleton good j ∈ [m]. Thus, v i, j is non-negative and integral for each agent i ∈ [n] and each good j ∈ [m]. We will also assume, without loss of generality, that for each good j ∈ [m], there exists some agent i ∈ [n] with a nonzero valuation for it, i.e., v i, j > 0. Finally, we let v max max i, j v i, j .
Allocation An allocation x ∈ {0, 1} n×m refers to an n-partition
, where x i ⊆ [m] is the bundle allocated to agent i. We let X denote the set of all n partitions of [m] . Given an allocation x, the valuation of an agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle
Another useful notion is that of a fractional allocation. A fractional allocation x ∈ [0, 1] n×m refers to a (possibly) fractional assignment of the goods to the agents such that no more than one unit of each good is allocated, i.e., for all j ∈ [m], we have i ∈[n] x i, j ≤ 1. We will use the term allocation to refer to an integral allocation, and explicitly write fractional allocation otherwise.
Fairness Notions
Envy-freeness and its variants Given an instance ⟨[n], [m], V⟩ and an allocation x, we say that an agent i ∈ [n] envies another agent k ∈ [n] if i strictly prefers the bundle of k over its own bundle, i.e., v i (x k ) > v i (x i ). An allocation x is said to be envy-free (EF) if each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any other agent, i.e., for every pair of agents i, k
An allocation x is said to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ x k such that v i (x i ) ≥ v i (x k \ {j}). Given any ε > 0, an allocation x is said to be ε-approximately envy-free up to one good (ε-EF1) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ x k such that
Nash social welfare Given an allocation x, write NSW(x) :
n to denote the Nash social welfare of x. An allocation x * said to be Nash optimal if x * ∈ arg max x∈X NSW(x).
Efficiency Notions
Pareto efficiency Given an instance ⟨[n], [m], V⟩ and an allocation x, we say that x is Pareto dominated by another allocation
for some agent i ∈ [n]. An allocation is said to be Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal (PO) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation. Similarly, x is ε-Pareto efficient (ε-PO) if it is not ε-Pareto dominated by any other allocation y, i.e., there does not exist an allocation y such that
Some of our results use a generalization of Pareto efficiency, which we call fractional Pareto efficiency. An allocation is said to be fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO) if it not Pareto dominated by any fractional allocation. Thus, a fractionally Pareto efficient allocation is also Pareto efficient, but the converse is not necessarily true (refer to the full version [3] for an example).
MAIN RESULTS
This section provides the statements of our three main results: an algorithm for finding an EF1 and PO allocation (Theorem 3.1), an existence result for EF1 and fPO allocation (Theorem 3.2), and an approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare (Theorem 3.3).
Algorithmic Result: 
Remark 1.
Note that when all valuations are polynomially bounded (i.e., there exists a polynomial f (m, n) such that for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], v i, j ≤ f (m, n)), an EF1 and PO allocation can be computed in polynomial time. In particular, this is true when all valuations are bounded by a constant. As mentioned earlier in Section 1, the problem of maximizing NSW remains APX-hard even for constant valuations [22] , and therefore our result circumvents the intractability associated with computing a Nash optimal allocation in order to achieve these two properties.
Remark 2. If we relax the fairness and efficiency requirements in Theorem 3.1 to their approximate analogues, then our algorithm is guaranteed to run in polynomial time. Specifically, our algorithm can find an ε-EF1 and ε-PO allocation in O poly(m, n, The proof of Theorem 3.1 is provided in Section 5.
Existence Result:
Theorem 3.2. Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) and fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO).
Remark 3. Consider the canonical binary relation R EF1+PO associated with the problem of finding an EF1 and PO allocation, defined as follows: For a fair division instance I and an allocation x, the relation R EF1+PO (I, x) holds if and only if x is an EF1 and PO allocation of I. It is relevant to note that under standard complexity theoretic assumptions, R EF1+PO is not in TFNP. 6 By contrast, the binary relation R EF1+fPO (I, x), which holds if and only if x is an EF1 and fPO allocation for the instance I, admits efficient verification. 7 Since Theorem 3.2 shows that R EF1+fPO is total, we get that the binary relation R EF1+fPO is in TFNP. Thus, there exists a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm for finding an EF1 and fPO (and hence EF1 and PO) allocation.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is deferred to the full version of the paper. 6 It is known that determining whether an arbitrary allocation is PO is co-NP-complete [14] . This fact can be used to show that verifying whether a given allocation is EF1 and PO is also co-NP-complete. Hence, the binary relation R EF1+PO cannot be efficiently verified (i.e., it is not in FNP), unless P = NP. 7 EF1 requires checking O(n 2 ) inequalities, and fPO can be verified by a linear program (refer to the full version). Our proof of Theorem 3.3 draws on the following interesting connection between approximate envy-freeness and Nash social welfare: Lemma 3.4. Given a fair division instance with identical and additive valuations, any ε-EF1 allocation provides a e (1+ε )/e -approximation to Nash social welfare.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is provided in Section 6.
OUR ALGORITHM
This section presents our algorithm. We start with the relevant preliminaries in Section 4.1 that provide the necessary definitions required for describing the algorithm. The pseudocode of the algorithm appears in Section 4.2 along with a brief description.
Market Terminology
Fisher market The Fisher market is a fundamental model in the economics of resource allocation [6] . It captures the setting where a set of buyers enter the market with prespecified budgets, and use it to buy goods that provide maximum utility per unit of money spent. Specifically, a Fisher market consists of a set [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n buyers, a set [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m} of m divisible goods (exactly one unit of each good is available), and a valuation profile
has an initial endowment (or budget) e i > 0. The endowment holds no intrinsic value for a buyer and is only used for buying the goods. We call e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) the endowment vector, and denote a market instance by
A market outcome is given by the pair ⟨x, p⟩, where the allocation vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a fractional allocation of the m goods, and the price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) associates a price p j ≥ 0 with each good j ∈ [m]. The spending of buyer i under the market outcome ⟨x, p⟩ is given by p(x i ) = m j=1 x i, j p j . The valuation derived by the buyer i under the market outcome ⟨x, p⟩ is given
Given a price vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p m ), define the bang per buck ratio of buyer i for good j as α i, j v i, j /p j , and its maximum bang per buck ratio as α i max j α i, j . 8 Let MBB i {j ∈ [m] : v i, j /p j = α i } denote the set of all goods that maximize the bang per buck ratio for buyer i at the price vector p. We call MBB i the maximum bang per buck set (or MBB set) of buyer i at the price vector p.
An outcome ⟨x, p⟩ is said to be a Fisher market equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Market clearing: Each good is either priced at zero or is completely allocated. That is, for
• Budget exhaustion: Buyers spend their endowments completely, i.e., p(x i ) = e i for all i ∈ [n].
• Maximum bang per buck allocation: Each buyer's allocation is a subset of its MBB set. That is, for any buyer i ∈ [n] and any good j ∈ [m], x i, j > 0 =⇒ j ∈ MBB i . Stated differently, each buyer only spends on its maximum bang per buck goods. Notice that a consequence of spending only on MBB goods is that each buyer maximizes its utility at the given prices p under the budget constraints.
We refer the reader to the full version for additional market preliminaries. 8 If v i, j = 0 and p j = 0, then we define α i, j = 0.
, Vol. Price envy-freeness and its variants Several of our results rely on constructing market outcomes with a property called price envy-freeness-a notion we consider to be of independent interest. Specifically, let x be an allocation and let p be a price vector for a given Fisher market. We say that x is price envy-free (pEF) with respect to p if for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], we have p(x i ) ≥ p(x k ). 9 Similarly, x is said to be price envy-free up to one good (pEF1) with respect to p if for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ x k such that p(x i ) ≥ p (x k \ {j}). Finally, given any ε > 0, we say that an allocation x is ε-approximately price envy-free up to one good (ε-pEF1) with respect to p if for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ x k such that
MBB graph and alternating paths The MBB graph of a Fisher market instance with a price vector p is defined as a bipartite graph G whose vertex set consists of the set of agents [n] and the set of goods [m], and there is an edge between an agent i ∈ [n] and a good j ∈ [m] if j ∈ MBB i (called an MBB edge). Given an allocation x, we can augment the MBB graph by adding allocation edges, i.e., an edge between an agent i ∈ [n] and a good j ∈ [m] such that j ∈ x i . For an augmented MBB graph, we define an alternating path P = (i, j 1 , i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . . . , i ℓ−1 , j ℓ , k) from agent i to agent k (and involving the agents i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i ℓ−1 and the goods j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j ℓ ) as a series of alternating MBB and allocation edges such that
If such a path exists, we say that the agent k is reachable from agent i via an alternating path. Notice that no agent or good is allowed to repeat in an alternating path. We say that the path P is of length 2ℓ since it consists of ℓ MBB edges and ℓ allocation edges.
Hierarchy structure Let G denote the augmented MBB graph for a Fisher market instance with the market outcome (x, p). Fix a source agent i ∈ [n] in G. Define the level of an agent k ∈ [n] as half the length of the shortest alternating path from i to k (if one exists). The level of the source agent i is defined to be zero. If there is no alternating path from i to some agent k in G (i.e., if k is not reachable from i), then the level of k is set to be n. The hierarchy structure H i of agent i is defined as a level-wise collection of all agents that are reachable from i, i.e.,
. . , }, where H ℓ i denotes the set of agents that are at level ℓ with respect to the agent i. The full version provides a polynomial time subroutine called BuildHierarchy for constructing the hierarchy.
Given a hierarchy H i , we will overload the term alternating path to refer to a series of alternating MBB and allocation edges connecting agents at a lower level to those at a higher level. That is, a path P = (i, j 1 , i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . . . , i ℓ−1 , j ℓ , k) involving agents from the hierarchy H i is said to be an alternating path if (1)
In particular, an alternating path in a hierarchy cannot have edges between agents at the same level.
Violators and path-violators Given a Fisher market instance and a market outcome (x, p), an agent i ∈ [n] with the smallest spending among all the agents is called the least spender, i.e., i ∈ arg min k ∈[n] p(x k ) (ties are broken according to a prespecified ordering over the agents). An agent k ∈ [n] is said to be a violator if for every good j ∈ x k , we have that p(x k \ {j}) > p(x i ), where i is the least spender. Similarly, agent k ∈ [n] is said to be an ε-violator if for every good j ∈ x k , we have that p(x k \ {j}) > (1 + ε)p(x i ). Notice that an agent can be a violator without being an ε-violator. Also notice that if no agent is a violator (ε-violator), then the allocation x is pEF1 (ε-pEF1) with respect to p. 9 Equivalently, for every pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], we require p(x i ) = p(x k ). A closely related notion is that of a path-violator. Let i denote the least spender, and let H i denote the hierarchy of agent i. An agent k ∈ H i is said to be a path-violator with respect to the alternating path P = (i,
Observe that a path-violator (along a path P) need not be a violator, since there can be a good j ∈ x k not on the path P such that p(x k \ {j}) ≤ p(x i ). Similarly, an agent k ∈ H i is said to be an ε-path-violator with respect to the alternating path P = (i,
Description of the Algorithm
Given any fair division instance I = ⟨[n], [m], V⟩ as input and a parameter ε > 0, our algorithm (Algorithm 1), referred to as Alg from here onwards, constructs a market equilibrium (x, p) with respect to a Fisher market instance ⟨[n], [m], V, e⟩ (for a suitable endowment vector e). The pair (x, p) has the following two properties: (1) x is an integral allocation, and (2) x is 3ε-pEF1 with respect to p. The second property allows us to show that the allocation x is 3ε-EF1 for the corresponding fair division instance I (see Lemma 4.1 below). Furthermore, by the first welfare theorem (Proposition 1), the allocation x is also guaranteed to be fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO) for the Fisher market instance, and consequently for the fair division instance I. Proof. Since x is ε-pEF1 with respect to the price vector p, for any pair of buyers i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ x k such that (1 + ε)p(x i ) ≥ p (x k \ {j}). Multiplying both sides by the maximum bang per buck ratio α i of agent i, we get
which is the ε-EF1 guarantee for the allocation x.
In order to construct the desired Fisher market equilibrium, our algorithm starts with a welfaremaximizing allocation x and a price vector p such that x is fPO and each agent gets a subset of its MBB goods (this is Phase 1 of Alg). If the allocation x is 3ε-pEF1 with respect to p, then the algorithm terminates with the output (x, p). Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds to the next phase.
In Phase 2, the algorithm works with the hierarchy of the least spending agent, and performs a series of exchanges (or swaps) of goods between the agents in the hierarchy (without changing the prices). The swaps are aimed at ensuring that at the end of Phase 2, no agent in the hierarchy is ε-pEF1 envied by the least spender. Furthermore, all exchanges in Phase 2 happen only along the MBB edges, thus maintaining at each stage the condition that x is an equilibrium allocation, and hence, fPO.
If, at the end of Phase 2, the current allocation x is still not 3ε-pEF1 with respect to the price vector p, the algorithm moves to Phase 3. This phase consists of uniformly raising the prices of the goods owned by the members of the hierarchy. The prices are raised until either the allocation x becomes 3ε-pEF1 with respect to the new price vector p, or a new agent gets added to the hierarchy. In the latter case, the algorithm goes back to the start of Phase 2.
It is relevant to note that establishing the time complexity of this algorithm is an intricate task; a priori, it is not even clear whether the algorithm terminates. 
in fact obtained via a number of involved arguments which, in particular, rely on analyzing the spending of the agents in different phases.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
This section presents the analysis of our algorithm and a proof of Theorem 3.1. Section 5.1 presents the analysis of our algorithm for valuations that satisfy the power-of-(1 + ε) property. Section 5.2 extends this analysis to general valuations, culminating in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Analysis of Alg when the Valuations are power-of-(1 + ε)
In this section, we will analyze Alg under the assumption that all valuations are power-of-(1 +ε), i.e., there exists ε > 0 such that for each agent i ∈ [n] and each good j ∈ [m], we have v i, j ∈ {0, (1 + ε) a } for some natural number a (possibly depending on i and j). We will start by defining the notion of a time step that will be useful in the subsequent analysis.
Time steps and events The execution of Alg can be described in terms of the following four events: (1) Swap operation in Phase 2, (2) Change in the identity of least spender in Phase 2, (3) Price-rise by a factor of α in Phase 3, and (4) Termination step. We use the term time step (or simply a step) to denote the indexing of any execution of Alg, e.g., Alg might perform a swap operation on the first and second time steps, followed by a price-rise in the third time step, and so on. We will use the phrase "at time step t" to denote the state of the algorithm before the event at time step t takes place. Notice that each event stated above runs in polynomial time, and therefore it suffices to analyze the running time of Alg in terms of the total number of events (or time steps). We will now proceed to analyzing the correctness (Lemma 5.1) and the running time (Lemma 5.2) of Alg for power-of-(1 + ε) valuations.
Lemma 5.1 (Correctness of Alg for power-of-(1 + ε) instance). Given any power-of-(1 + ε) instance as input, the allocation returned by Alg is 3ε-approximately envy-free up to one good (3ε-EF1) and fractionally Pareto efficient (fPO).
Proof. Let the output of Alg be (x, p). The fact that x is fPO follows from the observation that at each step of the algorithm, the allocation of any agent is a subset of its MBB goods, i.e., at each time step, we have x i ⊆ MBB i for each agent i ∈ [n]. This is certainly true at the end of Phase 1 by way of setting the prices. In Phase 2, each swap operation only happens along an alternating MBB-allocation edge, which maintains the MBB condition. Phase 3 involves raising the prices of the goods owned by the members of the hierarchy H i without changing the allocation. We will argue that for each agent k ∈ [n], if x k ⊆ MBB k before the price-rise, then the same continues to hold after the price-rise. Indeed, for any agent k H i , we have x k ∩ x H i = ∅. As a result, raising the prices of the goods in x H i does not affect the bang per buck ratio of agent k for the goods in x k (and can only reduce its bang per buck ratio for the goods in x H i ), thus maintaining the above condition. For any agent k ∈ H i , we have MBB k ⊆ x H i by construction of the hierarchy. Raising the prices of the goods in x H i therefore corresponds to lowering the MBB ratios for the agents in H i . By choice of α 1 , the price-rise stops as soon as a new MBB-edge appears between an agent k ∈ H i and a good j x H i . This ensures that the new maximum bang per buck ratio for any agent k ∈ H i does not fall below its second highest bang per buck ratio prior to the price-rise, thus guaranteeing x k ⊆ MBB k .
We can now define a Fisher market where each agent's endowment equals its spending under x. Since (x, p) is an equilibrium for this market, we have that x is fPO (Proposition 1).
Next, we will argue that x is 3ε-EF1. Notice that Alg terminates only if either the current outcome (x, p) is 3ε-pEF1, or when α = α 2 (Line 23). In the first case, we get that x is 3ε-EF1 for the underlying fair division instance (Lemma 4.1). Therefore, we only need to analyze the second case. Output: An integral allocation x and a price vector p. 
// -----------------------------Phase 1: Initialization-----------------------------
1 x ← Welfare-maximizing allocation (allocate each good j to the agent i ∈ arg max k ∈[n] v k, j ) 2 p ← For each good j ∈ [m], set p j = v i, j if j ∈ x i . 3 if (x, p) is 3ε-pEF1 then return (x, p)
// ------------------Phase 2: Removing price-envy within hierarchy------------------
4 i ← least spender under (x, p) /*
// -------------------------------Phase 3: Price-rise-------------------------------
, where α h is the maximum bang per buck ratio for agent h, and x H i is the set of goods currently owned by members of the hierarchy H i /* α 1 corresponds to raising prices until a new agent gets added to the hierarchy */
/* α 2 corresponds to raising prices until the pEF1 condition is satisfied */ 19 α 3 ← (1 + ε) s , where s is the smallest integral power of (1 + ε) such that
p(x i ) ; here i is the least spender and h ∈ arg min k ∈[n]\H i p(x k ). /* α 3 corresponds to raising prices in multiples of (1 + ε) until the identity of the least spender changes */ Let us suppose that the termination happens at time step t, and let q be the price vector maintained by Alg just before the price-rise step that lead to termination. After the time step t, Alg terminates with the allocation x and price vector p. Since Phase 3 does not change the ownership of the goods, the allocation maintained by Alg just before termination is also x.
Let i be the least spender at time step t, and let H i be the hierarchy of agent i. Since Phase 3 only affects the prices of the goods in x H i , we have that p(x k ) = q(x k ) for all k ∈ [n] \ H i , and p(x k ) = α 2 q(x k ) for all k ∈ H i . Additionally, at the end of (any execution of) Phase 2, no agent in the least spender's hierarchy is an ε-path-violator (and hence is also not an ε-violator). Thus,
By definition of α 2 , we have the following condition for the agents outside the hierarchy:
Equations (1) and (2) together imply that
which means that the outcome (x, p) is ε-pEF1 for agent i. If agent i is a least spender under (x, p) (i.e., i continues to a least spender after the price rise), then x is ε-pEF1 with respect to p, and the lemma follows. Otherwise, an agent h ∈ arg min k ∈[n]\H i q(x k ) must become the least spender after the final price-rise step. In this case, we have that
where the last inequality follows from Equation (3). Since 0 < ε < 1, we have that (1 + ε) 2 < 1 + 3ε. Thus, the new least spender (agent h) satisfies
This implies that (x, p) is 3ε-pEF1. The stated claim now follows from Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 5.2 (Running time bound for power-of-(1 + ε) instance). Given any power-of-(1 + ε) instance as input, Alg terminates in time O poly(m, n,
The proof of Lemma 5.2 appears in the full version of the paper.
Analysis of Alg for General Valuations: Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this section, we will show that for any given fair division instance I = ⟨[n], [m], V⟩ with integral valuations, an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto efficient (PO) can be found in pseudopolynomial time (Theorem 3.1). In particular, for bounded valuations, this result provides a polynomial time algorithm for computing an EF1 and PO allocation (Remark 1).
We will prove Theorem 3.1 by running Alg on a ε-rounded version I ′ = ⟨[n], [m], V ′ ⟩ of the given instance I for some parameter ε > 0. The instance I ′ is a power-of-(1 + ε) instance 10 constructed by rounding up the valuations in I to the nearest integer power of (1 + ε). From Lemma 5.1, we know that the allocation returned by Alg is 3ε-EF1 and fPO with respect to I ′ (for any given 10 Recall that in a power-of-(1 + ε ) instance, we have v i, j ∈ {0, (1 + ε ) a } for some a ∈ N (possibly depending on i and j). . Then, an allocation x is δ -EF1 for I if and only if it is EF1 for I. . From Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, we know that an allocation x that is 3ε-EF1 and fPO for I ′ can be found in O poly(m, n, 1 ε , ln v max ) time. Under the stated choice of ε, Lemma 5.3 implies that x must be Pareto efficient (PO) for I. Therefore, we only need to show that x is EF1 for the instance I.
Proof. If x is δ -EF1, we have that for every pair of agents
Since x is 3ε-EF1 for I ′ , we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], there exists a good j ∈ x k such that
Finally, since the valuations in I ′ are a rounded-up version of those in I, we have that v i, j ≤ v ′ i, j for each good j ∈ [m], and thus
, which means that x is 7ε-EF1 for the instance I. Instantiating Lemma 5.4 for δ = 7ε gives that x is EF1 for I.
Lemma 5.5. Given the ε-rounded version I ′ (of the instance I) as input, Alg finds a 7ε-EF1 and ε-PO allocation for I in O(poly(m, n,
Proof. Let x be the allocation returned by Alg. From Lemma 5.1, we know that x is 3ε-EF1 and fPO for the ε-rounded instance I ′ . By an argument similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.1, this implies that x is 7ε-EF1 for the original instance I. The running time guarantee follows from Lemma 5.2. Hence, we only need to show that x is ε-PO.
Suppose, for contradiction, that x is ε-Pareto dominated by an allocation y. construction of the ε-rounded instance I ′ , we know that v k, j ≤ v ′ k, j ≤ (1 + ε)v k, j for each agent k and each good j. Using the inequality v ′ k, j ≤ (1 + ε)v k, j in a good-by-good manner for the bundle x k , along with the additivity assumption of valuations in the instance I, we get that
. However, this means that the allocation y Pareto dominates the allocation x in the instance I ′ , which is a contradiction since x is fPO for I ′ .
NASH SOCIAL WELFARE APPROXIMATION: PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3
This section proves that Alg provides a 1.45 (≈ e 1/e )-approximation for the Nash social welfare maximization problem in polynomial time. We begin by showing (in Lemma 3.4) that if the valuations of all the agents are identical, then any ε-EF1 allocation provides a e (1+ε )/e -approximation to Nash social welfare. We will then use this result, along with an appropriate choice of ε, to prove the desired approximation bound in Theorem 3.3.
Lemma 3.4. Given a fair division instance with identical and additive valuations, any ε-EF1 allocation provides a e (1+ε )/e -approximation to Nash social welfare. Then, there is a partially-fractional allocation ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) ∈ F B that maximizes Nash social welfare (among allocations in F B ) such that (1) Each agent gets at most one good from B under ω. That is, for each agent i ∈ [n], we have that |{j ∈ [m] : ω i, j > 0} ∩ B| ≤ 1. (2) Any agent with strictly-better-than-the-worst allocation under ω gets exactly one integral good (and no fractional good). That is, for any agent i ∈ [n] such that v(ω i ) > min k v(ω k ), we have ω i, j = 1 for some j ∈ B, and ω i, j ′ = 0 for all j ′ j.
Proof. (of Lemma 6.1) We will consider a partially-fractional allocation ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω n ) ∈ F B that maximizes the Nash social welfare over F B , and show that it can be transformed (without decreasing NSW) into an allocation in F B that satisfies the stated properties.
Observe that if an agent i ∈ [n] receives a fractional good under ω (i.e., ω i, j ′ > 0 for some j ′ B), then its value v(ω i ) is equal to µ min k v(ω k ). This is because if v(ω i ) > µ, then we can "redistribute" j ′ between agent i and the least valued agent arg min k v(ω k ) to obtain another fractional allocation in F B with Nash social welfare strictly greater than that of ω. This contradicts the optimality of ω.
Therefore, any agent with value strictly greater than µ can only receive integral goods. We will show that any such agent necessarily receives exactly one integral good, and hence establish property (2) . Suppose, for contradiction, that some agent i ∈ [n] receives distinct goods a, b ∈ B (i.e., ω i,a = ω i,b = 1), and v(ω i ) > µ. Since |B| < n, there exists some agent k ∈ [n] that does not receive any integral good from B. Since agent k only receives fractional goods under ω, it follows from the above argument that v(ω k ) = µ. We can now assign one of the integral goods (say a) to agent k, and redistribute the fractional goods in ω k between the agents i and k to obtain a new partially-fractional allocation with strictly greater Nash social welfare than ω. This contradicts the optimality of ω. Therefore, any agent with value strictly greater than µ must receive exactly one integral good under ω.
Next we address property (1) . Note that this property already holds for agents with value strictly greater than µ. Hence, we only need to consider agents whose value is exactly equal to µ. Let i ∈ [n] be an agent that receives two distinct goods a, b ∈ B such that v(ω i ) = µ. Since |B| < n, there must exist an agent k ∈ [n] that only receives fractional goods under ω. We can now perform a "swap" by assigning one of the integral goods (say a) to agent k, and fractional goods of total value v(a) in ω k to agent i to obtain a new partially-fractional allocation in F B with the same Nash social welfare as ω. Such a swap is always possible, since v(a) ≤ v(ω i ) = µ = v(ω k ). By repeating this process at most n times, we can obtain an NSW maximizer satisfying property (1).
We will now prove Lemma 3.4. 
We will use д i to denote a largest valued good in the bundle x i of agent i, i.e., д i ∈ arg max д ∈x i v(д). The fact that x is an ε-EF1 allocation implies that
Define B {д 1 , д 2 , . . . , д n−1 }. Let ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) ∈ F B be a partially-fractional allocation (with respect to B) that maximizes Nash social welfare among all allocations in F B . Since F B contains all the integral allocations, we have NSW(ω) ≥ NSW(x * ), where x * is a Nash optimal (integral) allocation. Hence, to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that NSW(x) ≥ 1 e (1+ε )/e NSW(ω). Define α min k ∈[n] v(ω k )/ℓ, and let H {k ∈ [n] : v(x k ) > αℓ}. We will now consider partially-fractional allocations wherein only (and all) the goods in x H have to be allocated integrally, and the remaining goods can be fractionally allocated. Write F x H to denote the set of all such partially-fractional allocations.
The rest of the proof consists of four parts: First, we will construct an allocation x ′ ∈ F x H such that NSW(x ′ ) ≤ NSW(x). (Doing this will allow us to work with the ratio NSW(x ′ ) NSW(ω) , which is convenient to bound from below.) Second, we will derive a lower bound on NSW(x ′ ) in terms of the relevant parameters α, ℓ, and n (and two other parameters h and t that we will define shortly). Third, we will derive an upper bound on NSW(ω) in terms of the same parameters. Finally, we will derive relationships between these parameters in order to achieve the stated approximation ratio.
• Constructing the allocation x ′ : We start by initializing x ′ ← x. While there exist two agents
(the larger valued bundle). In particular, this transfer of goods ensures that the Nash social welfare does not increase. Also, this process must terminate because after every iteration of the while-loop, either v( • Lower bound for NSW(x ′ ): Notice that there can be at most one agent s in the allocation x ′ such that v(x ′ s ) ∈ (ℓ, αℓ). This is because the while-loop continues to execute if there are two or more such agents. For every other agent
) ≥ αℓ}| denote the number of agents with a valuation at least αℓ in the allocation x ′ . Thus, there are (n − t) agents with valuation strictly below αℓ in x ′ . We lower bound the valuations of these agents by ℓ in order to obtain the following relation:
• Upper bound for NSW(ω): Recall that ω = (ω 1 , . . . , ω n ) ∈ F B is a partially-fractional allocation (with respect to B) that maximizes Nash social welfare, and |B| < n. Using Lemma 6.1, we can assume, without loss of generality, that ω has the following two properties: (1) each agent i ∈ [n − 1] gets the good д i under ω (this can be ensured via reindexing since the valuations are identical), and (2) 
, then agent i gets exactly one integral good under ω (and no fractional good).
We will now argue that
and therefore v(ω k ) > αℓ. We also know that min k ∈[n] v(ω k ) = αℓ, and therefore, by property (2), agent k must get exactly one integral good д k under ω (and no fractional good). However,
By a similar reasoning, we can show that v(
\ H , then by property (2), agent k must get exactly one integral good д k under ω (and no fractional good). This would imply that v(
which contradicts the fact that k ∈ [n] \ H . These observations imply the following upper bound on the Nash social welfare of ω:
• Deriving relationship between the parameters: From Equation (4) and from the fact that
Hence, we can upper bound the value of all goods in [m] excluding the h goods in the set k ∈H {д k }, as follows:
Next, we will derive a lower bound for this total value by considering ω. Note that all the goods in the set k ∈H {д k } are integrally allocated under ω. Hence, at least (n − h) agents do not receive any good from the set k ∈H {д k }. The cumulative value derived by these agents under ω is at least αℓ(n − h), since min k v(ω k ) = αℓ. Using Equation (7) and the fact that h ≤ t, we get
Simplification gives that t ≥ (α −1)(n−1) α +ε , which can be further simplified to obtain Recall that NSW(x) ≥ NSW(x ′ ). Using the above relation with Equations (5) and (6) gives
The −1 /n term in the exponent of α can be neglected via a scaling argument, as follows: Construct (for analysis only) a scaled-up instance I ′ consisting of c ≥ 1 copies of the instance I. For any allocation y that is ε-EF1 for I, the allocation y ′ = (y, y, . . . , y) is ε-EF1 for I ′ . Write n ′ , α ′ , ℓ ′ , ω ′ to denote the analogues of n, α, ℓ, ω in I ′ . Also, letω denote the fractional allocation (ω, ω, . . . , ω) in I ′ . It is easy to see that n ′ = cn, α ′ = α, and ℓ ′ = ℓ. Moreover,
where the first term is for the instance I, and the remaining terms are for the instance I ′ . In addition, the relation NSW(ω ′ ) ≥ NSW(ω) follows from the optimality of ω ′ for I ′ . By choosing a sufficiently large value of c, the term − 1 /cn in the exponent can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore, the lower bound in Equation (8) with z ≥ 0 is minimized at z = e. This gives a lower bound of e −(1+ε )/e , as desired.
We will now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.3. The proof relies on transforming a general fair division instance into one with identical valuations, and showing that the Nash social welfare of the allocation returned by Alg is preserved in this transformation. 1/n times NSW(y) in the original instance I. Therefore, in order to obtain the desired approximation guarantee, it suffices to show that z achieves an approximation factor of 1.45 in the scaled instance I sc .
Let ω denote a Nash optimal (integral) allocation in the original instance I. By the above argument, ω is Nash optimal in the scaled instance I sc as well. Additionally, for each agent i in I sc , we have that v sc i, j = q j for all j ∈ MBB i , and v sc i, j < q j for all j MBB i . Therefore, for any agent i, we have v sc (z i ) = q(z i ) (since, from Lemma 5.1, we have that z i ⊆ MBB i ), and v sc i (ω i ) ≤ q(ω i ). Consequently, the Nash social welfare of the computed allocation z and the optimal allocation ω satisfy the following relations in the scaled instance I sc : 
11 A similar scaling was used by Cole and Gkatzelis [13] in their analysis of NSW approximation. We will further transform the valuations in I sc to obtain an instance I id = ⟨[n], [m], V id ⟩ with identical valuations. Specifically, we set v id i, j = q j for all i and j. We know from Lemma 5.1 that z is 3ε-pEF1 with respect to q in the original instance I, and that z i ⊆ MBB i for each agent i ∈ [n]. It then follows that z is 3ε-EF1 in the identical valuations instance I id . Furthermore, when ε = (using Equation (10)).
The previous inequality and Equation (9) together give us an approximation factor of 1.45 under the valuation profile V sc :
, which provides a similar approximation guarantee for the original instance I. Finally, observe that the allocation z can be computed in polynomial time for the above choice of ε (Lemma 5.5). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We studied the problem of finding a fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods. Our work provided a framework based on integral Fisher markets and an (approximate) price envy-freeness condition resulting in a pseudopolynomial algorithm for finding an EF1 and PO allocation, and a polynomial time 1.45-approximation algorithm for Nash social welfare. Determining whether there exists a (strongly) polynomial time algorithm for the problem of finding an EF1 and PO allocation remains an interesting direction for future work. Extensions of our results to more general classes of valuations (e.g., submodular) will also be interesting.
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